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24 February 1953

CIA Proposed Revision to SE-36

8. Present Strength of Long Range Aviation: Long-range

Aviation, consisting of three Air Armies, one in the Far East and two in the western USSR, constitutes the strategic striking force of the USSR. [The USSR has apparently given a considerably lower priority to the development of its means of delivering an atomic attack (particularly against the US) than it has to its defenses against atomic attack.] The only Soviet bomber known to be in operational use capable of carrying mass destruction weapons to distant targets is the TU-4, the equivalent of the US obsolete B-29. Using these aircraft, however, the USSR has built up a substantial striking force. In December 1952 the number of TU-4's believed to be operational was estimated at 900 aircraft. (This figure was based primarily upon the identification of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with, or in the process of being equipped with, TU-4 aircraft.) About 20%, or about 190 TU-4's, of the medium bomber strength is located in the Far East.

9. Future Strength and Composition of Long-range Aviation:

The future strength and composition of the Soviet long-range bomber force is difficult to estimate. [Accurate information does not exist on current production rates of TU-4's or on the relation of such rates of production to available production facilities. Similarly] there is virtually no information on Soviet development work on new types of medium or heavy bombers. No prototype jet medium bomber has yet been observed or otherwise identified. A prototype heavy bomber has been

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observed and was probably powered by a piston engine. ~~It is speculated that~~ It may ultimately be powered by a turboprop engine. This type of aircraft is not known to be in series production. It seems only safe to assume, however, that the USSR is planning to replace the obsolete TU-4 with aircraft of higher performance characteristics. The following table of the estimated strength and composition of the Soviet long range bomber force through 1955 is based, therefore, on the assumption that the USSR has begun production of a heavy bomber and that it will initiate such production of other advanced types of long-range bombers during the period of this estimate. It should be noted, however, that there is no positive evidence that this development has actually begun or is planned.

	<u>Mid-1953</u>	<u>Mid-1954</u>	<u>Mid-1955</u>
Medium Bomber			
Jet	Possible Prototype	10/20	120
Piston	900	1000	900
Heavy Bomber	Few	40/80	180
	900	1050-1100	1200

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V. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF THE FOREGOING
CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE US

30. The Soviet rulers would expect a direct attack on the United States to precipitate general war. In such a war the Soviet rulers would expect to have an initial preponderance of military power on the Eurasian continent, but would be concerned to prevent (a) immediate US retaliatory air attack on the Soviet Union with weapons of mass destruction, (b) mobilization of the superior war potential of the Western allies, particularly that of the United States, and (c) US reinforcement of anti-Soviet forces in Eurasia.

31. The Soviet rulers have demonstrated their sensitivity to the danger of US air attack on strategic targets in the USSR with weapons of mass destruction by the high priority which they have given to the development of defenses against such an attack. Despite the substantial progress already achieved in building up their defenses, it is unlikely that they would regard their defensive capabilities as adequate to prevent substantial numbers of attacking aircraft from reaching strategic targets in the USSR. It is likely, therefore, that in initiating atomic warfare an immediate Soviet concern would be to destroy or cripple US capabilities for retaliation in kind, with particular reference to SAC continental and overseas bases. They would also be concerned to deliver such an attack on industrial and psychological targets in the United States as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of the US war potential, and to retain the means to counter any US reinforcement or reinvasion of Eurasia.

32. As among the available forces and weapons for attacking the US, the USSR would be obliged to rely primarily upon open military attack with atomic bombs delivered by TU-4 aircraft, for the following reasons:

a. The low capabilities of conventional naval forces and airborne forces.

b. The security difficulties inherent in large-scale clandestine attack. (The Soviet rulers have a pathological distrust of their own people, including Communists, and almost certainly would not trust them in massive clandestine operations under circumstances in which defection or failure would have potentially disastrous consequences for the USSR itself.)

c. Other methods of delivery of atomic weapons are insufficiently developed for effective large-scale use.

d. Other mass destruction weapons are insufficiently developed or subject to other handicaps in their large-scale use.

33. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking the US concurrently with or immediately following an open and direct atomic attack. In the cases of guided missiles, airborne attack, submarine bombardment, and biological warfare, Soviet capabilities at best appear to be severely limited. Chemical attack in connection with, or subsequent to, atomic bombing is ~~more~~ *likely*.

~~possible~~

Extensive widespread


34. Clandestine attack of any substantial magnitude, because of the security difficulties inherent in such action and because of the

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obstacles to coordinating its timing with that of overt attack from the outside, is unlikely to be used immediately preceding or concurrent with an overt attack. Clandestine attack on a small scale, in the form of sabotage or biological warfare, might occur at any time, and even without an overt attack ever being launched. Subsequent to an overt attack, clandestine attack in any form could be expected to the maximum practicable extent.

35. The USSR has the economic resources and the technological ability to improve its present capabilities for direct attack on the United States. It is entirely reasonable to expect that it will do so, and that the magnitude of the Soviet threat will be greater. We believe, however, that the considerations affecting Soviet employment of these increased capabilities will remain throughout this period essentially the same as those outlined above.



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SECURITY INFORMATION

SE-36

Paras on Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons

W/ ~~In addition to the manufacture of atomic weapons for use in~~
~~serial bombs, guided missiles, and underwater mines,~~ the USSR is
 capable of producing atomic weapons which are capable of being smuggled
 into the US, either as complete assemblies or ~~broken down into~~
 component parts or sub-assemblies. The weight of assembled devices
 could range from a few hundred pounds to several thousand. The size *of the*
~~[necessary] components~~ could range from a package small enough to put into the luggage compartment
 of an automobile to a package large enough to contain an automobile. *The* Smaller weapons could be broken down into a number of
 relatively simple and readily transportable components which would
 not require more than elementary technical skill to assemble. Such
quantity a small weapon would give a relatively low efficiency and kilotonnage
 yield. Weapons giving a higher yield would require more skill to
 assemble and would involve more difficulties in transporting to the
 point of detonation. It is conceivable that only the fissionable
 material need be introduced into the US, the other components being
 procurable on a commercial basis. Such a plan, however, would require
 highly skilled personnel and subject the whole enterprise to virtually
 insurmountable security hazards.

A variety of forms of clandestine delivery suggest themselves.
 Atomic weapons could be delivered by disguised TU-4 aircraft, could
 be detonated in the hold of a merchant ship or even as underwater mines.

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They could be smuggled in piecemeal through the diplomatic pouch, put ashore by submarines, smuggled across land borders, introduced through normal import channels, or even introduced as bonded merchandise awaiting transshipment. The selection of the method of introduction, and of methods of assembly and transport to point of detonation presumably would be made according to the risk of detection and objective desired. It is not considered possible that the USSR could surmount the problems (e.g., the number of persons involved) necessary to achieve a massive ~~instant~~ blow against the US by clandestine means.



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Change paragraph E. Chemical Warfare to read as follows:

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While there is no ^{direct} positive evidence that actual production of a nerve gas is taking place, [it is believed that] the USSR may have been producing at least one of the nerve gases since 1949 and has developed one other nerve gas through the pilot plant stage. [By mid-1955, stocks of these agents ^{mt} should be available for limited operational employment.] ² Assuming that the stockpile of standard agents ^{which} and munitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and will be available for use during the period of this estimate, ~~the USSR should be well equipped for all phases of chemical warfare.~~

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Proposed Revision to:

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21. Electronic Countermeasures: The USSR has had access to a wide variety of US defensive radar and to US jamming equipment. The USSR is apparently well aware of the tactical advantage to be gained by jamming defensive radar and other communications. We estimate that today the USSR can ^{or interfere with} ~~seriously~~ disrupt long-range radio communications between the continental US and ~~the~~ overseas facilities and Allies. ~~and further~~ ^{we} believe that the USSR will increase its ^{the} effectiveness as well as the proficiency in number of its trained personnel throughout the period of this estimate. It is believed probable that the USSR has produced sufficient electronic countermeasures devices to equip some TU-4 aircraft. It is not known whether Soviet TU-4's have in fact been equipped with such jamming equipment, or what would be the effectiveness of those devices against US defensive radar.

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10. TU-4 Aircraft Characteristics: The TU-4, under standard operating conditions, is estimated to have a combat radius of 1700 nautical miles, and a combat range of 3100 nautical miles with a 10,000 pound bomb load. Under cruise control conditions necessary to reach distant target areas, its speed would be approximately 175 knots at an altitude of about 10,000 feet. However, it is capable for a limited period of time of attaining a maximum speed of 317 knots at about 32,500 feet with a service ceiling of 39,500. While there are no indications that the Soviets have done so, the combat radius could be increased approximately 250 nautical miles by stripping the armament, except tail turret, from TU-4 and in addition reducing its crew by one. ^{that} Note/such modification increases the vulnerability of this plane.

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